One of the reasons that participants employ the project finance model as opposed to traditional finance is because infrastructure projects require large volumes of capital. With so many participants, risk can be allocated among the parties best able to bear it. Because project finance is a common financing mechanism for long-term, labor-intensive projects, risks are abundant and may surface at any one of the many stages in the project cycle. This next section will discuss the main risks inherent in project finance and how the various parties, in their agreements with each other, attempt to mitigate them.
Commercial Risks: In the larger scheme of commercial risks, there are two main types of financial risks: interest rate risk and currency risk. Like in traditional finance, changes to the interest rate may negatively affect the financier or the SPV, or both. Most projects are long-term so lenders charge floating rates (as opposed to predetermined, set rates) based on market conditions. Therefore, when interest rates rise, the costs of the project will increase and the SPV may find itself unable to meet its financial obligations. In order to mitigate this problem, when possible, it is best for the SPV to negotiate a either a fixed interest rate or a floating interest rate, but one that floats only within a fixed manageable range. Alternatively, the SPV may use interest-rate swaps to mitigate the risk that a floating rate will increase. The SPV may swap with another party, like a private bank, the floating interest rate for a fixed interest rate on the principal amount the SPV borrowed.
Currency risk is also a serious financial risk to project finance, and one that is not easily mitigated. Currency risk occurs when revenues are generated in one currency while debts must be repaid in a different currency. This is called currency mismatch. In project finance, financing is typically received in the currency in which the lender operates and the lender expects to receive payment in the same currency—e.g., a U.S. bank lends in dollars and expects to be repaid in dollars. However, because currency exchange rates fluctuate, an SPV may find itself unable to pay its lenders if the domestic currency suddenly and significantly drops in value. For example, fluctuations in exchange rates may make repayment difficult if an SPV generates revenue in the Thai baht, but must pay back in dollars. If the baht drops in value with respect to the dollar, then the SPV will need to come up with more baht to pay back the loan because one baht now pays back less debt then before the devaluation.
During the Asian Financial Crisis, many Asian countries’ currencies suffered significant depreciation; Indonesia’s Java Bali Power Grid project demonstrates the extreme effect of currency mismatch. The off-take purchaser (power purchaser in this case) bore the currency risk under the purchase agreement, and when the Indonesian rupiah fell 87% in 1996, the power purchaser’s rates to customers skyrocketed because of its obligations to pay for the debt in dollars. As a result, the power purchaser had to pay approximately 400% of the original price. Similar to interest rate swamps, the SPV may mitigate risks stemming from currency exchange-rate fluctuations by utilizing a currency swap, allowing the SPV to convert debt into a more stable currency. Also, a real exchange-rate liquidity (REX) facility may be used, which addresses the risk of a devaluation of the local currency. In the event of a specified devaluation, resulting in a cash flow shortfall, the facility provides liquidity to cover the debt payments.
Closely related to the currency mismatch are demand risks. Essentially, either through poor planning or because of some extraneous event like the Asian Financial Crisis, demand for the project-finance generated goods or service may drop, in which case the essential element of project finance—the revenue stream to pay back loans—is reduced. A drop in demand was the reason the Pigbilao Project failed in the Philippines. The project was well financed and completed on time, but when the Asian crisis hit in the 1990’s, demand for energy fell significantly. Napocor, the Philippines National Power Company, was the off-take purchaser and bore the demand risk. When demand fell and prices rose, Napocor feared political backlash and had to subsidize the price of energy. The best method to mitigate demand risks is for the parties to do extensive pre-construction forecasting of future demand. Additionally, the party bearing the demand risk may seek a guarantee from a third party like the World Bank, as detailed below.
Political Risks: Political risks take various forms, which include changes in a government’s authority, legislation, and budget. Sponsoring companies often overlook the possibility of a change of authority, yet a regime change or a change in power of a ruling party can influence the success of both the construction and operation of a project. Given the close relationship of the SPV and the host country in project finance, even the possibility of a change can be disruptive to the progress of a site. Government corruption can also seriously hinder a project.
A change in the political authority, either of a political system (like a change from autocracy to democracy) or a change of from one political party to another within a political system, may lead to changes in the host country’s position on a vital element of an agreement. Take for instance the Dabhol power project in India. The sponsoring companies negotiated a rushed agreement with the Indian government, which was anxious to have foreign investment in the region, forming the Dabhol Power Company (DPC). In 1995, Dabhol became a major campaign issue in the Maharashtra state election. The Congress Party lost control to a coalition party formed by Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the ShivSena. The two parties won on a platform that advocated hostility to the sponsoring companies of the Dabhol Power Company. Once in power, the new government created the Munde Committee, which reviewed the Dabhol power project and determined that the Indian government rushed into an agreement with DPC, and that the agreement was too one-sided. As a result, the government ordered DPC to stop construction. After lengthy negotiations, the agreement with India was renegotiated. While the project did not ultimately fail because of the political change (it failed because of miscalculation for demand), the Dabhol power project demonstrates the extent to which a change in power can bring a project to a standstill.
Political risks are mitigated by political risk insurance. Private companies as well as multinational organizations (like MIGA, which has a special political insurance service) provide insurance in a traditional sense, in addition to issuing performance bonds that guarantee completion.
Legal Risks: Changes to the laws governing elements of agreement, status, or operations of the project can significantly affect the costs of an operation. Specifically, changes in import and export tariffs can increase costs by preventing access to cheap raw materials or by forcing the SPV to use inferior domestic inputs. A host government may want to achieve certain short-term economic or social goals by changing the tax code, which can purposefully or inadvertently affect the project structure. The rate at which host country taxes the SPV or other parties will significantly affect the financial benefits to participants. Finally, the host country can adopt laws that change the legal status of the SPV, or change the laws governing ownership of companies or real estate, which can have a catastrophic effect on the project. Legal risks are most often mitigated by guarantees (which are elaborated upon below) from one of the participants—most commonly the host government.
Construction, Operation, and Technical Risks: Construction, operation and technical risks are usually assessed during the first stages of the project in a “feasibility study” that carefully examines risks associated with putting up the project as well as the technical and environmental regulations that may impact the project. The main construction risk is that construction will be stopped or significantly delayed. Sometime construction is delayed because builders do not have access to materials, but it may also be intertwined with other risks, such a political risk that may halt construction.
In a power project, for example, the construction risk may be that the builders will have delay or problems having equipment shipped to the site. A technical risk may be access to a power grid for the distribution of power to customers. Because storing power can be very challenging, immediate access in proportion to demand is essential for a successful power project. A thorough feasibility study should examine construction risks as well as how power will be interconnected to the main power grid, technology compatibility issues, and how revenue will be calculated. In order to mitigate some of the risks, parties can draft legal agreements that specify the terms under which the SPV has access to the grid, and how the power generation site will connect to the grid. To mitigate construction risks, the SPV can negotiate for the builder rather than the SPV to bear that risk. Such agreements are instrumental for the success of a project, since access to the power grid is an essential component of generating revenue to repay loans. Another risk is that the host country could change technical requirements before the project is complete. For example, the laws on environmental protection may change or the national legislature may pass a new law that requires a higher density of steel for structures of a certain height, affecting the project’s compliance with building regulations.
A feasibility study evaluates environmental regulations and the effect of building a site at a particular location. In order to comply with national and international environmental laws, companies often conduct extensive environmental impact analyses. If an international or national environmental agency detects non-compliance, a project may be shut down, fined, or may face social and political backlash.
Mitigating Risk with Guarantees: As referenced above, one important method of mitigating commercial, political, legal and construction risks is for the SPV (the most common recipient) to acquire guarantees by the parties best able to bear the associated risk. Most commonly, large multilateral organizations like the World Bank, and regional development banks, like the Asian Development Bank, provide guarantees for worthy projects. However, any one of the participants can provide a guarantee on any one of the associated risks.
Guarantees are credit enhancement devices. For example, during the early stages of construction, the sponsor company may be the guarantor. Contractors usually guarantee project completion either by performance bonds or payment bonds (guarantees that subcontractors will be paid). Often, multilateral and bilateral organizations mitigate financial and political risks by issuing guarantees. In turn, the guarantors may purchase insurance in case they have to provide capital for a default under the guarantee agreement. Depending on the organization of the projects, the roles of other participants, and the nature of the agreement with the sponsor company or SPV, guarantees can take various forms. Typically, third-party guarantors like a multilateral organization or a regional bank do not sign unconditional guarantees, but rather limited or indirect guarantees. Often, these guarantees are in the form of “put options,” where the guarantor promises to pay for any liability of the obligor (the project company), but the project company must pay back the guarantor.
Without guarantees, some projects may never start. For example, in 2006, the International Development Bank (IDB), Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and Steadfast Insurance Company (SIC), a subsidiary of Zurich Financial Services Group, (that is in turn is insured by Oversees Private Insurance Corporation), contributed $250 million of guarantees to a $510 million gas pipeline that stretches 678 km approximately 15 miles off the coast of Nigeria to Ghana. Along the way, smaller pipelines that lead to intake locations in Benin and Togo connect to the pipeline.
As one of the largest private investments in West Africa, the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) could not have been possible without the guarantees by multilateral and bilateral organizations. Nigeria, Ghana, Benin and Togo are developing countries, so private investors entering the region face significant political risks. By providing complementary guarantees (there was no interest rate attached to the guarantee) to the government of Ghana, the International Development Association (IDA) guaranteed that if the Government of Ghana was unable to make payments on the gas under the off-take agreement, the IDA would satisfy the SPV’s debt repayment obligations to its financiers.